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TZID:America/Detroit
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DTSTART:20070311T020000
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DTSTAMP:20230331T094626
DTSTART;TZID=America/Detroit:20230407T100000
DTEND;TZID=America/Detroit:20230407T112000
SUMMARY:Workshop / Seminar:Colluding Against Environmental Regulation
DESCRIPTION:We study collusion among firms against imperfectly monitored environmental regulation. Firms increase variable profits by violating regulation and reduce expected noncompliance penalties by violating jointly. We consider a case of three German automakers colluding to reduce the effectiveness of emission control technology. By estimating a structural model of the European automobile industry from 2007 to 2018\, we find that the collusion lowers expected noncompliance penalties substantially and increases buyer and producer surplus. Welfare decreases by € 0.73–2.51 billion because of increased pollution. We show how environmental policy design and antitrust play complementary roles in preventing noncompliance.
UID:105700-21812809@events.umich.edu
URL:https://events.umich.edu/event/105700
CLASS:PUBLIC
STATUS:CONFIRMED
CATEGORIES:Economics,Industrial Organization,Microeconomics,seminar
LOCATION:Lorch Hall - Lorch 301
CONTACT:
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