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DTSTART:20070311T020000
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DTSTAMP:20260128T082422
DTSTART;TZID=America/Detroit:20260320T143000
DTEND;TZID=America/Detroit:20260320T155000
SUMMARY:Workshop / Seminar:Who and How? Adverse Selection and Flexible Moral Hazard (by Henrique Castro-Pires\, Deniz Kattwinkel\, and Jan Knoepfle)
DESCRIPTION:We characterize incentive compatible mechanisms in environments with hidden types and flexible hidden actions. Our approach introduces extended recommendation schedules that specify prescribed actions also off-path\, after misreports. This approach yields a tractable and complete characterization of incentive compatibility\, which includes a generalized integral monotonicity condition capturing the interaction between adverse selection and moral hazard. We demonstrate the usefulness of the characterization across a range of contracting problems.
UID:143378-21892966@events.umich.edu
URL:https://events.umich.edu/event/143378
CLASS:PUBLIC
STATUS:CONFIRMED
CATEGORIES:Economics,seminar,Theory
LOCATION:North Quad - 4300
CONTACT:
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