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DTSTART:20070311T020000
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DTSTAMP:20260409T092232
DTSTART;TZID=America/Detroit:20260417T143000
DTEND;TZID=America/Detroit:20260417T155000
SUMMARY:Workshop / Seminar:Incentive Compatibility and Belief Restrictions (with A. Penta)
DESCRIPTION:We study a framework for robust mechanism design with multiple agents that accommodates various degrees of robustness with respect to agents' beliefs\, and encompasses both the belief-free and Bayesian robustness criteria. For general \emph{belief restrictions}\, we characterize the set of incentive compatible direct transfer mechanisms in general environments with interdependent values. Based on a \emph{first-order approach}\, we obtain a design principle to attain incentive compatibility via `belief-based' terms. In environments that satisfy a property of \emph{generalized independence}\, our results imply a \emph{robust} version of \emph{revenue equivalence}. Extending the notion of correlated information\, we introduce a notion of \emph{comovement} between types and beliefs\, defined based on a moment condition. Under comovement\, we characterize the full set of `belief-based' terms. Based on this\, we show that from Bayesian settings the following result extends to this fairly mild restriction on beliefs: any allocation rule can be implemented\, even in environments without single-crossing or monotonicity. However\, full rent extraction need not follow. Information rents typically remain\, and they decrease monotonically as the robustness requirement is weakened.
UID:143384-21892974@events.umich.edu
URL:https://events.umich.edu/event/143384
CLASS:PUBLIC
STATUS:CONFIRMED
CATEGORIES:Economics,seminar,Theory
LOCATION:North Quad - 4300
CONTACT:
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