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DTSTART:20070311T020000
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DTSTAMP:20260403T100021
DTSTART;TZID=America/Detroit:20260417T100000
DTEND;TZID=America/Detroit:20260417T112000
SUMMARY:Workshop / Seminar:Going for Broker? Intermediation in Health Insurance Markets
DESCRIPTION:This paper studies how insurance brokers affect product choices\, premiums\, and welfare in the employer-sponsored insurance market. We compile a novel database of contracting relationships among employers\, brokers\, and insurers in New York State. Exploiting variations in commission schedules\, we document two market distortions: First\, brokers exhibit traditional agency frictions\, steering employers towards more financially lucrative products. Second\, commission levels affect ex-ante insurer-broker networks and\, in turn\, insurers' competitive pressure\, leading to anti-competitive distortions. We develop and estimate a structural model of employer insurance demand\, insurer pricing\, and formation of broker-insurer contracting networks. We use the model to study a commission-cap counterfactual. A one-percentage-point cap reduces broker-induced steering and raises employer surplus by 3\%\, but the resulting reduction in insurer competition lowers surplus by over 6\%\, yielding a net decline of about 3\%. We also explore the impacts of fiduciary duties and network regulations for insurance brokers.
UID:147379-21900941@events.umich.edu
URL:https://events.umich.edu/event/147379
CLASS:PUBLIC
STATUS:CONFIRMED
CATEGORIES:Economics,Industrial Organization,seminar
LOCATION:North Quad - 4300
CONTACT:
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