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DTSTAMP:20260901T143450
DTSTART;TZID=America/Detroit:20261013T130000
DTEND;TZID=America/Detroit:20261013T142000
SUMMARY:Workshop / Seminar:Strategically Controlling Worldviews
DESCRIPTION:This paper studies persuasive behavior when the sender can control both the information the receiver observes and the model through which it is interpreted (the narrative). Even when the receiver begins with a correctly specified model and understands the sender’s strategic incentives\, the sender can manipulate him and often secure her preferred action with probability one. The key mechanism highlights a strong complementarity between strategic communication of information and narratives\, allowing the sender to strictly outperform a Bayesian persuader with commitment power. We fully characterize the sender-optimal equilibrium for a broad class of information technologies. Softer information lowers the bar for full manipulation\, while harder information expands the set of environments where any manipulation is possible. The results provide a formal foundation for understanding the widespread success of disinformation.
UID:149501-21906528@events.umich.edu
URL:https://events.umich.edu/event/149501
CLASS:PUBLIC
STATUS:CONFIRMED
CATEGORIES:Economics,seminar,Theory
LOCATION:North Quad - 4300
CONTACT:
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