BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//UM//UM*Events//EN
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
BEGIN:VTIMEZONE
TZID:America/Detroit
TZURL:http://tzurl.org/zoneinfo/America/Detroit
X-LIC-LOCATION:America/Detroit
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZOFFSETFROM:-0500
TZOFFSETTO:-0400
TZNAME:EDT
DTSTART:20070311T020000
RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYMONTH=3;BYDAY=2SU
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:-0400
TZOFFSETTO:-0500
TZNAME:EST
DTSTART:20071104T020000
RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYMONTH=11;BYDAY=1SU
END:STANDARD
END:VTIMEZONE
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260904T093649
DTSTART;TZID=America/Detroit:20260911T100000
DTEND;TZID=America/Detroit:20260911T112000
SUMMARY:Workshop / Seminar:Selective Outreach and Spillovers from Targeted Interest Rate Caps
DESCRIPTION:Many countries implement interest rate caps that target specific loan segments\, reducing their profitability. Whether lenders reallocate credit supply away from targeted segments depends on how borrowers and lenders are matched. This paper studies the credit supply and welfare effects of targeted interest rate caps when lenders selectively reach out to borrowers\, a common practice in many settings. Using a reform that tightened interest rate caps on agricultural loans in Ecuador\, I show that\, consistent with the reallocation prediction\, cooperatives reduced agricultural lending and increased non-agricultural lending. By contrast\, banks expanded agricultural lending. I develop an empirical model in which lenders allocate supply by selectively extending offers to borrowers. I find that\, although all lenders reduced their offers to agricultural borrowers\, banks' originations increased because steeper price cuts raised borrower acceptance. Most of the cross-sector supply reallocation and welfare losses in the agricultural sector are due to targeting.
UID:151562-21911765@events.umich.edu
URL:https://events.umich.edu/event/151562
CLASS:PUBLIC
STATUS:CONFIRMED
CATEGORIES:Economics,Industrial Organization,seminar
LOCATION:North Quad - 4300
CONTACT:
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR