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In the Critique of Judgment, Kant claims that what he calls common sense (Gemeinsinn) is presupposed not only by judgments of beauty—which are a primary focus of the work—but by judgment in general. It is a matter of dispute, however, how Kant understands common sense and what role he takes it to play in judgment. I argue that for Kant, common sense is the capacity to become aware of a kind of intellectual harmony between one’s imagination and understanding. On his account, I argue, awareness of this harmony plays a necessary role not only in judgments of beauty but also in judgments through which we acquire new empirical concepts, since both types of judgment are not determined by concepts we already possess. Thus, the notion of common sense provides a key link between two seemingly disparate types of judgment discussed in the Critique of Judgment. In closing, I offer some considerations in favor of Kant’s claim that the acquisition of a system of empirical concepts depends on a feeling of intellectual harmony.