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DTSTART;TZID=America/Detroit:20210212T150000
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SUMMARY:Livestream / Virtual:Mind & Moral Psychology: Jonathan Phillips (Dartmouth)
DESCRIPTION:NOTE: A password is required to attend this virtual event.  Please contact Laura Soter at lksoter@umich.edu to request the password.\n\nResearch on theory of mind has primarily focused on demonstrating and understanding the ability to represent others' non‐factive mental states\, for example\, others' beliefs in the false‐belief task. Representations of knowledge\, by contrast\, have received comparatively little attention and have often been understood as depending on prior representations of belief. After all\, how could one represent someone as knowing something if one doesn’t represent them as believing it? Drawing on a wide range of methods across cognitive science\, I consider which is the more basic kind of representation. The evidence indicates that non-human primates attribute knowledge but not belief\, that knowledge representations arise earlier in human development than belief representations\, that the capacity to represent knowledge may remain intact in patient populations even when belief representation is disrupted\, that knowledge (but not belief) attributions are likely automatic\, and that explicit knowledge attributions are made more quickly than equivalent belief attributions. Critically\, the theory of mind representations uncovered by these various methods exhibit a set of signature features clearly indicative of knowledge: they are not modality-specific\, they are factive\, they are not just true belief\, and they allow for representations of egocentric ignorance. I argue that these signature features elucidate the primary function of knowledge representation: facilitating learning from others about the external world. This suggests a new way of understanding theory of mind—one that is focused on understanding others’ minds in relation to the actual world\, rather than independent from it.
UID:79502-20343471@events.umich.edu
URL:https://events.umich.edu/event/79502
CLASS:PUBLIC
STATUS:CONFIRMED
CATEGORIES:Philosophy,Psychology
LOCATION:Off Campus Location
CONTACT:
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