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DTSTART:20070311T020000
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260928T222213
DTSTART;TZID=America/Detroit:20261006T130000
DTEND;TZID=America/Detroit:20261006T142000
SUMMARY:Workshop / Seminar:A Prior-Agnostic Test for Bayesian Updating (by Cheaheon Lim and Tomasz Strzalecki)
DESCRIPTION:We develop a test of Bayesian updating “in the field\,” where the analyst observes neither the likelihood function nor the realized signals. Our test works ex post\, conditional on every realized state\, and is prior-agnostic in the sense that its validity does not require the agent’s prior to be “correct.” We compare our procedure to tests based on the martingale property of beliefs\, which are valid only ex ante\, before the state is realized\, and only if the prior is correct. Whereas martingale tests are sensitive to correlation between issues\, our test is robust to such dependence. Even when issues are independent\, we find that our test typically has greater power relative to the martingale-based tests. In an empirical application using individual-level belief data\, we illustrate how our procedure provides a more direct test of Bayesian updating than the martingale-based alternatives.
UID:149500-21906527@events.umich.edu
URL:https://events.umich.edu/event/149500
CLASS:PUBLIC
STATUS:CONFIRMED
CATEGORIES:seminar,Theory,Economics
LOCATION:North Quad - 4300
CONTACT:
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260901T143450
DTSTART;TZID=America/Detroit:20261013T130000
DTEND;TZID=America/Detroit:20261013T142000
SUMMARY:Workshop / Seminar:Strategically Controlling Worldviews
DESCRIPTION:This paper studies persuasive behavior when the sender can control both the information the receiver observes and the model through which it is interpreted (the narrative). Even when the receiver begins with a correctly specified model and understands the sender’s strategic incentives\, the sender can manipulate him and often secure her preferred action with probability one. The key mechanism highlights a strong complementarity between strategic communication of information and narratives\, allowing the sender to strictly outperform a Bayesian persuader with commitment power. We fully characterize the sender-optimal equilibrium for a broad class of information technologies. Softer information lowers the bar for full manipulation\, while harder information expands the set of environments where any manipulation is possible. The results provide a formal foundation for understanding the widespread success of disinformation.
UID:149501-21906528@events.umich.edu
URL:https://events.umich.edu/event/149501
CLASS:PUBLIC
STATUS:CONFIRMED
CATEGORIES:Economics,seminar,Theory
LOCATION:North Quad - 4300
CONTACT:
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260721T142759
DTSTART;TZID=America/Detroit:20261030T143000
DTEND;TZID=America/Detroit:20261030T155000
SUMMARY:Workshop / Seminar:Economic Theory Seminar: Friday\, October 30
DESCRIPTION:--
UID:149502-21906529@events.umich.edu
URL:https://events.umich.edu/event/149502
CLASS:PUBLIC
STATUS:CONFIRMED
CATEGORIES:Economics,seminar,Theory
LOCATION:North Quad - 4300
CONTACT:
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260721T143517
DTSTART;TZID=America/Detroit:20261113T143000
DTEND;TZID=America/Detroit:20261113T155000
SUMMARY:Workshop / Seminar:Economic Theory Seminar: Friday\, November 13
DESCRIPTION:--
UID:149503-21906530@events.umich.edu
URL:https://events.umich.edu/event/149503
CLASS:PUBLIC
STATUS:CONFIRMED
CATEGORIES:Economics,Theory,seminar
LOCATION:North Quad - 4300
CONTACT:
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260726T180939
DTSTART;TZID=America/Detroit:20261117T130000
DTEND;TZID=America/Detroit:20261117T142000
SUMMARY:Workshop / Seminar:Joint Economic Theory and Econometrics Seminar: Tuesday\, November 17
DESCRIPTION:--
UID:149504-21906531@events.umich.edu
URL:https://events.umich.edu/event/149504
CLASS:PUBLIC
STATUS:CONFIRMED
CATEGORIES:Economics,seminar,Theory
LOCATION:North Quad - 4300
CONTACT:
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260721T144256
DTSTART;TZID=America/Detroit:20261204T140000
DTEND;TZID=America/Detroit:20261204T155000
SUMMARY:Workshop / Seminar:Economic Theory Seminar: Friday\, December 4
DESCRIPTION:--
UID:149505-21906532@events.umich.edu
URL:https://events.umich.edu/event/149505
CLASS:PUBLIC
STATUS:CONFIRMED
CATEGORIES:Economics,seminar,Theory
LOCATION:North Quad - 4300
CONTACT:
END:VEVENT
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