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DTSTAMP:20250204T090133
DTSTART;TZID=America/Detroit:20241004T140000
DTEND;TZID=America/Detroit:20241004T150000
SUMMARY:Other:Student Sustainability Coalition Coffee Chats
DESCRIPTION:Navigating the variety of avenues to engage in sustainability work on campus can be daunting and confusing! Come talk with the Student Sustainability Coalition (SSC) to learn more about sustainability initiatives on campus and WE WILL BUY YOU A DRINK!\n\n\n\nCoffee chats happen every Friday from 2-3p at Maizes in The League from 2-3p. Look for the \"SSC: Coffee Chats\" sign!\nCoffee chats also happening on select Mondays at Palmer Commons from 11-12p!\n\nSEE YOU THERE!
UID:118258-21853796@events.umich.edu
URL:https://events.umich.edu/event/118258
CLASS:PUBLIC
STATUS:CONFIRMED
CATEGORIES:Discussion,Undergraduate Students,Sustainability,Social Impact,Prospective Undergraduate Students,Prospective Graduate Students,Interdisciplinary,In Person,Graduate and Professional Students,Environment,Ecology,Activism
LOCATION:Michigan League - Maizes
CONTACT:
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20241001T150152
DTSTART;TZID=America/Detroit:20241004T143000
DTEND;TZID=America/Detroit:20241004T155000
SUMMARY:Workshop / Seminar:Ex Post Strategy-proofness
DESCRIPTION:In this paper\, we study ex post strategy-proofness (ESP)\, a natural notion of strategy- proofness in settings with interdependent values. ESP requires that\, for every agent\, truthful reporting is always optimal regardless of the strategies and types of other agents. For environments with transfers\, ESP implementability is characterized by a generalized cyclical monotonicity condition. Alternatively\, implementability can be characterized by an optimality condition related to an induced matching problem between types and alternatives. In an important class of environments where types satisfy a generalized “one-dimensionality” property\, implementability is equivalent to a simple monotonicity condition where “higher” types receive “higher” alternatives. Using this finding\, we show that for a single object auction\, more allocation rules are implementable if either the type space is less dense or the extent of preference interdependence is less severe. For environments without transfers\, nontrivial implementation is possible only when preferences exhibit sufficient independence. In the context of binary and ternary voting models\, we illustrate how this condition significantly constrains the scope of implementation.
UID:127248-21858735@events.umich.edu
URL:https://events.umich.edu/event/127248
CLASS:PUBLIC
STATUS:CONFIRMED
CATEGORIES:Economics,Theory
LOCATION:Lorch Hall - 301
CONTACT:
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