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TZID:America/Detroit
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TZOFFSETFROM:-0500
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DTSTART:20070311T020000
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20251217T170423
DTSTART;TZID=America/Detroit:20260107T150000
DTEND;TZID=America/Detroit:20260107T180000
SUMMARY:Other:Off-Campus Winter Welcome
DESCRIPTION:Welcoming off-campus students back to campus\, with a fun engagement activity and information about off campus housing resources.
UID:142865-21891745@events.umich.edu
URL:https://events.umich.edu/event/142865
CLASS:PUBLIC
STATUS:CONFIRMED
CATEGORIES:beyond the diag,dean of students office,Housing,Transfer Students,Winterwelcome2026
LOCATION:Michigan Union - Willis Ward Lounge
CONTACT:
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260103T231530
DTSTART;TZID=America/Detroit:20260107T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/Detroit:20260107T170000
SUMMARY:Workshop / Seminar:: Variance strikes back: sub-game--perfect Nash equilibria in time-inconsistent N-player games\, and their mean-field sequel
DESCRIPTION:We investigate a time-inconsistent\, non-Markovian finite-player game in continuous time\, where each player's objective functional depends non-linearly on the expected value of the state process. As a result\, the classical Bellman optimality principle no longer applies. To address this\, we adopt a two-layer game-theoretic framework and seek sub-game--perfect Nash equilibria both at the intra-personal level\, which accounts for time inconsistency\, and at the inter-personal level\, which captures strategic interactions among players. We first characterise sub-game--perfect Nash equilibria and the corresponding value processes of all players through a system of coupled backward stochastic differential equations. We then analyse the mean-field counterpart and its sub-game--perfect mean-field equilibria\, described by a system of McKean-Vlasov backward stochastic differential equations. Building on this representation\, we finally prove the convergence of sub-game--perfect Nash equilibria and their corresponding value processes in the N-player game to their mean-field counterparts. This is joint work with Dylan Possamaï.
UID:143154-21892328@events.umich.edu
URL:https://events.umich.edu/event/143154
CLASS:PUBLIC
STATUS:CONFIRMED
CATEGORIES:Mathematics
LOCATION:Off Campus Location
CONTACT:
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