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DTSTART:20070311T020000
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DTSTAMP:20231127T142914
DTSTART;TZID=America/Detroit:20231206T141000
DTEND;TZID=America/Detroit:20231206T163000
SUMMARY:Conference / Symposium:Rewriting Conventional Societal Narratives with Data and AI
DESCRIPTION:The ubiquity of data and the emergence of Artificial Intelligence (AI) are rapidly reshaping every aspect of human society. However\, as with any emerging technology\, data and AI are deeply entwined with our social matrix. Many scholars have been directing our attention to how data and AI can amplify the existing structural and cultural injustice. At the U-M Data Science and AI Summit 2020\, Catherine D’ignazio and Lauren Klein\, authors of the now classic “Data Feminism”\, advocated for data scientists to adopt principles of feminism to challenge authority and convention\, which sparked enthusiastic calls for actions on campus. In this mini-symposium\, we will hear presentations from leading researchers who have done just that: using data and AI to challenge and rewrite the conventional narrative about a variety of social issues. We will also organize faculty research roundtable discussions to stimulate new research ideas under the same theme.\n\nRegistration: https://umich.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_fFkP_nPEQjKw5aRZJotm-A\n\nFor more details\, please visit our event page: https://midas.umich.edu/rewriting-conventional-narratives/
UID:110339-21824794@events.umich.edu
URL:https://events.umich.edu/event/110339
CLASS:PUBLIC
STATUS:CONFIRMED
CATEGORIES:Artificial Intelligence,Interdisciplinary,Social Sciences
LOCATION:Off Campus Location
CONTACT:
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DTSTAMP:20231129T190744
DTSTART;TZID=America/Detroit:20231206T143000
DTEND;TZID=America/Detroit:20231206T153000
SUMMARY:Performance:Performance Practice: End of Semester Showing
DESCRIPTION:Students in Professor Amy Chavasse's course \"Performance Practice\" present dance works created during the term in an informal showing\, with performances by MFA and BFA dance students. \n\nMovement based research forms the foundation for explorations across media and methods. Guest artists from the Arts & Resistance Theme Semester contributed to the practice and creation of the works.
UID:115627-21835171@events.umich.edu
URL:https://events.umich.edu/event/115627
CLASS:PUBLIC
STATUS:CONFIRMED
CATEGORIES:North Campus,Free,Dance
LOCATION:Dance Building - Dance Performance Studio Theatre
CONTACT:
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20231205T092139
DTSTART;TZID=America/Detroit:20231206T143000
DTEND;TZID=America/Detroit:20231206T155000
SUMMARY:Workshop / Seminar:When do Firms Profit from Wage Setting Power?
DESCRIPTION:In standard models of labor market monopsony\, the profits derived from firm monopsony power depends on the firm's labor supply elasticity. There are two puzzles facing these standard models. First\, different standard approaches to estimating labor supply elasticities produce dramatically different estimates and hence measures of profits from monopsony power. Second\, commonly used low labor supply elasticities imply profit shares of aggregate income that are too high after accounting for price markups and capital income. This paper argues that both of these issues arise from the same limitation - that firms can increase employment only by raising wages. To address this\, we develop a tractable model where firms use both higher wages and costly recruiting expenditures to attract workers. Firms have wage setting power due both to search frictions and workers' heterogeneous preferences over workplaces. We show that whether firms profit from their wage setting power depends on the shape of firms' recruiting cost function\, and the rents acquired by firms from wage setting power can be dissipated by recruiting costs. In a calibrated quantitative model that also accounts for the strategic behavior of a large firm\, profits from wage setting power account for 6% of labor market-wide marginal product and 5% of output. Our findings suggest that wage setting power alone does not imply profits for firms that exploit this power.
UID:115570-21835030@events.umich.edu
URL:https://events.umich.edu/event/115570
CLASS:PUBLIC
STATUS:CONFIRMED
CATEGORIES:Economics,Labor,seminar
LOCATION:
CONTACT:
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