Presented By: Population Studies Center
PSC Brownbag Series: Traditional Institutions in Modern Times: Dowries as Pensions When Sons Migrate
Corinne Low
PSC Brown Bag Seminar: Corinne Low (Online only!)
The PSC Brown Bag Series runs Mondays from 12 to 12:50 p.m.
Corinne Low of Wharton, University of Pennsylvania, presents online only:
Traditional Institutions in Modern Times: Dowries as Pensions When Sons Migrate
This paper examines whether an important cultural institution in India – dowry – can enable male migration by increasing liquidity at the time of marriage. We hypothesize that one cost of migration is the disruption of traditional elderly support structures, where sons co-reside with their parents and care for them in their old age. Dowry can attenuate this cost by providing sons and parents with a liquid transfer that eases constraints on income sharing. To test this hypothesis, we collect two novel datasets on property rights over dowry among migrants and among families of migrants. Net transfers of dowry to a man’s parents are common. Consistent with using dowry for income sharing, transfers occur more when sons migrate, especially when they work in higher-earning occupations. Nationally representative data confirms that migration rates are higher in areas with stronger historical dowry traditions. Finally, exploiting a large-scale highway construction program, we show that men from areas with stronger dowry traditions have a higher migration response to reduced migration costs. Despite its potentially adverse consequences, dowry may play a role in facilitating migration and, therefore, economic development
Join Zoom Meeting
https://umich.zoom.us/j/95418610585?pwd=Z0cvdkF1T0R2cG1lRDEvVmlnbVdlZz09
Meeting ID: 954 1861 0585
Passcode: 818420
One tap mobile
+13017158592,,95418610585# US (Washington DC)
+13092053325,,95418610585# US
The PSC Brown Bag Series runs Mondays from 12 to 12:50 p.m.
Corinne Low of Wharton, University of Pennsylvania, presents online only:
Traditional Institutions in Modern Times: Dowries as Pensions When Sons Migrate
This paper examines whether an important cultural institution in India – dowry – can enable male migration by increasing liquidity at the time of marriage. We hypothesize that one cost of migration is the disruption of traditional elderly support structures, where sons co-reside with their parents and care for them in their old age. Dowry can attenuate this cost by providing sons and parents with a liquid transfer that eases constraints on income sharing. To test this hypothesis, we collect two novel datasets on property rights over dowry among migrants and among families of migrants. Net transfers of dowry to a man’s parents are common. Consistent with using dowry for income sharing, transfers occur more when sons migrate, especially when they work in higher-earning occupations. Nationally representative data confirms that migration rates are higher in areas with stronger historical dowry traditions. Finally, exploiting a large-scale highway construction program, we show that men from areas with stronger dowry traditions have a higher migration response to reduced migration costs. Despite its potentially adverse consequences, dowry may play a role in facilitating migration and, therefore, economic development
Join Zoom Meeting
https://umich.zoom.us/j/95418610585?pwd=Z0cvdkF1T0R2cG1lRDEvVmlnbVdlZz09
Meeting ID: 954 1861 0585
Passcode: 818420
One tap mobile
+13017158592,,95418610585# US (Washington DC)
+13092053325,,95418610585# US
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Livestream Information
LivestreamMarch 27, 2023 (Monday) 12:00pm
Meeting Password: 818420
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