Title: The Metaphysical Basis of Aristotle's Logic
Abstract: According to Bertrand Russell, the first serious advance in logic since the time of the Greeks was made by Frege, when he argued that the propositions Socrates is mortal and All humans are mortal are not of the same logical form. Aristotle, by contrast, took these propositions to be of the same logical form. In his view, both are simple categorical propositions in which one being is predicated of another being, universal or particular. I shall argue that Aristotle adopted this view because he thought that it provides a metaphysically perspicuous representation of the structure of beings underlying a science. Thus, while his system of categorical logic does not possess the deductive and expressive power of Frege's system, it is well suited for representing what Aristotle took to be explanatory scientific demonstrations.

Marko Malink is Professor of Philosophy & Classics. He received an M. A. from the University of Leipzig (2004), where he studied Logic and Ancient Greek. He earned a Dr. Phil. in Philosophy from Humboldt University of Berlin (2008). His primary area of research is ancient philosophy, especially ancient logic and metaphysics. Malink also has interests in the history of logic, philosophy of language, and linguistics. His book Aristotle’s Modal Syllogistic was published by Harvard University Press in 2013. Some of his articles were selected for inclusion in The Philosopher's Annual, which aims to collect the ten best articles published in philosophy each year (2013, 2016, 2018). Prior to joining the Faculty at NYU in 2014, Malink has held positions at Humboldt University of Berlin and the University of Chicago.