COMMITTEE:
Buss, Sarah (co-chair)
Caston, Victor (co-chair)
Railton, Peter
Shapiro, Gabe
Janko, Richard (cognate, Classical Studies)

ABSTRACT:
This dissertation is about how Aristotle understands the nature and value of passions. In the first chapter, I focus on how Aristotle thinks passions function, a question I show is central to his own investigation. I argue that Aristotle thinks passions function to motivate action in response to the evaluative considerations that passions make salient. I then show how this function helps us better understand how Aristotle thought passions help us navigate the world. In the second chapter, I argue that we can illuminate Aristotle’s description of self-control as intrapersonal persuasion by looking at his account of interpersonal persuasion, where he discusses concrete strategies that direct the audience’s attention, evoke their passions, and motivate them to act differently. The dynamics of these cases of interpersonal persuasion provide us with the outline of a compelling Aristotelian model of self-control. In the third chapter, I develop an account of why Aristotle thinks it is impossible to feel fear and anger at the same time and show how this leads to what I call affective dilemmas: cases where a person must choose (in a sense) between two incompatible passions, each of which would accurately represent how things are in the world.