Title: Rational Introjection

Abstract: Michael Strevens coined the term ‘introjection’ for the kind of psychological process that, in humans, is normally responsible for the acquisition of new conceptual mental representations. This talk will work toward a theory of the (epistemic) rationality constraints that govern introjection. I will first argue that the discredited ‘definitional’ theory of introjection is a better rational theory of introjection than is usually supposed, and that it is not superseded by recent Quinean approaches (e.g., Carey, Margolis, Strevens). I will then propose a variant of the definitional theory, the ‘referential theory’, that avoids the main problem for the definitional approach. I end by considering why referential introjection may be a more successful cognitive strategy than non-referential definitional introjection.

About Professor Gómez Sánchez:
Verónica Gómez Sánchez is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at UC Berkeley. Her main research interests are in the metaphysics of science and philosophy of cognitive science. The overarching goal of her current research is to understand how the properties and laws of the special sciences (especially cognitive science) fit into the physical world. She has a special interest in the nature of mental representation and its role in scientific explanation. Verónica got her PhD in Philosophy from Rutgers University and my BA from Universidad de los Andes. Before coming to Berkeley, she was a Bersoff Faculty Fellow at NYU.