https://philosophy.stanford.edu/people/rachael-briggs

According to the Dominance Principle, one should not choose a dominated act--one that yields a worse outcome than some other act no matter what the state of the world. Similarly, many epistemic decision theorists hold an Epistemic Dominance Principle, which says that one should not adopt a dominated belief state --one that is less accurate than some other belief state no matter what the state of the world. The Epistemic Dominance Principle is useful for vindicating probabilism.

Recently, authors like Michael Caie and Richard Pettigrew have raised doubts about the epistemic version of the Dominance Principle. They argue that where a dominating belief state is unavailable or unchoiceworthy (in the right way), it cannot give us sufficient reason to reject the belief state it dominates.

I argue that the correct response to these challenges is to break the Dominance Principle into two parts: one that connects dominance to value comparisons, and another that connects value comparisons to choices. According this response, domination by an unavailable belief state is not a sufficient reason to reject a belief state, but domination by an unchoiceworthy belief state sometimes is.