Moon will present a puzzle about belief and credence, which takes the form of three independently supported views that are mutually inconsistent. The first is the view that S has a modal belief that p (e.g., S believes that probably-p) if and only if S has a corresponding degree of credence that p (e.g., S has a moderately high credence that p). This view is a component of credal expressivism, a popular view among philosophers working on epistemic modals. The second is the view that S believes that p only if S has some credence that p. This view is entailed by most theories about the relationship between belief and credence. The third is that certain intuitive judgments about certain cases, to be presented below, are true. He will then attempt to solve the puzzle by arguing against the second view. He argues that one can believe that p without having any credence that p.
This paper advances the literature in a couple of ways. First, the puzzle is new and connects three areas of philosophy: the semantics of epistemic modals, the nature of belief, and the relationship between belief and credence. These connections are not easy to see, and it is valuable to see how views in one area have implications for views in the other areas. Second, the puzzle provides an endorser of any one of the three views with the dilemma of having to reject one of the other two independently supported views. It is valuable, for example, to see that credal expressivism faces a dilemma, since it is a relatively new and prominent view.

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