Moral abolitionists tend to share the view that moral discourse promotes self-deception or otherwise inhibits normatively important forms of self-knowledge. Fortunately, we can ignore abolitionist critiques unless moral error theory succeeds. Or so goes the assumption I term the Central Misconception. It is a misconception because a normative critique of moral discourse need have no truck with moral error theory. And the misconception is central in the sense that it is a primary impediment to recognizing that investigating the value of moral discourse ought to be a more central task in metaethics. I argue that the Central Misconception has served to preclude awareness that a variety of non-error-theoretic views are compatible with—and many are quite friendly to—moral abolitionism. I try to show that even if expressivism or non-error-theoretic subjectivism can defeat error theory, such abolitionist critiques can remain entirely unaffected. Yet more surprisingly, prominent forms of these views unwittingly support abolitionist critiques. I conclude that the Central Misconception has contributed to a widespread andunjustified complacency about the value of ordinary moral discourse.