The recent philosophical literature on science and values has focused primarily on questions about whether non-epistemic values can play legitimate roles in scientific reasoning and, if so, how to distinguish influences that are legitimate from those that are illegitimate. This paper argues that the question of how to achieve adequate transparency about the influences of non-epistemic values deserves much more attention. First, the paper argues that transparency is crucial for responding to an important ethical worry about non-epistemic influences on science—namely, that they threaten principles of democratic accountability and individual self-determination. Second, it shows that achieving adequate transparency about the influences of non-epistemic values is much more difficult than it initially appears. Finally, it proposes an overarching strategy for achieving greater transparency, focusing on the identification of specific value judgments that are of particular significance to stakeholders. It concludes by highlighting the wide range of institutions and initiatives needed for implementing this strategy and by identifying a number of questions that merit further discussion.