Some philosophers deny that anger is ever fitting, while others consider vicious, self-destructive, or always wrong to act upon. We will first argue that the best gloss of anger takes it to be directed at offenses, understood as transgressive actions that provide reason to retaliate (in the first-person case) or to punish (in the third-person case). Call such backward-looking considerations, about what people do and why they do it, retributive reasons. If anger is ever fitting, then retributive reasons exist; and anger, like other natural emotions, is sometimes fitting. This result itself is significant, because it belies the claims of those who endorse the so-called utilitarian theory of punishment, and it illustrates the significance of a sentimental value: the anger-worthy. But it also forms the basis of our sentimentalist defense of retributivism, which constitutes an all-things-considered justification of punishment relying partly on retributive reasons.