KEYNOTE ABSTRACT
When we doubt a belief, we examine how things look from a perspective in which that belief is set aside. Sometimes we care about what that perspective recommends and, as a result, we abandon the belief we've been doubting. Other times we don't: we recognize that a perspective in which a certain belief is set aside recommends abandoning it, but we go on believing it anyway. Why is this? In this paper, I'll consider and then reject some proposals concerning when to defer to the perspective of doubt. I'll argue that ultimately the question of whether to defer to doubt on any given occasion can’t be answered through rational deliberation.

Full schedule available at event website

SATURDAY, 8/24
10:30am–11:30am | Joseph Moore (Princeton), "Rules to Live Well By"
12:00pm–1:00pm | Samuel Fullhart (Princeton), "Collective Action, Prediction, and Deliberation"
2:30pm–3:30pm | Elise Woodard (Michigan) and Calum McNamara (Michigan), "Probabilistic Reasons"
4:00pm–6:00pm | Keynote Address by Miriam Schoenfield (MIT), "Deferring to Doubt"

SUNDAY, 8/25
10:30am–11:30am | Megan Wicks (Princeton), "Thoughts on Abuse"
12:00pm–1:00pm | Emma Hardy (Michigan), "Ameliorative Moves in the Free Will Debate"
3:00pm–4:00pm | Rebecca Harrison (Michigan), "Railton on Responding to Reasons"
4:30pm–5:30pm | Brendan Mooney (Michigan), "Normative Implications of Metanormative Theory"