Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have very few formal international agreements with each other despite sharing attributes that existing scholarship argues promote international cooperation – for example, geographic contiguity, similar legal system, and cultural affinity. Even if we look solely at the UAE and Saudi Arabia, which are both wealthy states, they have registered only one bilateral agreement with the United Nations. In contrast, Canada and the US have registered over 300 bilateral agreements. Does this absence of formal agreements among GCC states imply a cooperation failure? In co-authored work with Melissa Carlson, Koremenos argues that authoritarian monarchies frequently cooperate with each other but do so informally. At the domestic level, absolute monarchs pursue their personal interests by unilaterally and non-transparently developing and implementing policies. These norms of domestic policymaking engender an “absolutist logic,” which shapes how absolute monarchs selectively use informal and formal cooperation at the international level. When cooperating with each other, absolute monarchs maximize mutual private benefits through similarly unilateral and non-transparent policymaking, producing secret, cartel-like informal international agreements. One important implication of our work is that it is regime type, not religion, that drives particular state preferences for informality, thereby refuting prominent work in the field that argues it is the Islamic nature of certain states that propels them toward informal cooperation.

Political Science Professor Barbara Koremenos received her Ph.D. from the University of Chicago. She won a National Science Foundation CAREER Award for her research -- the first such winner to study international relations and law. She has given seminars in the United States, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Latvia, South Korea, Spain, and Switzerland. Her award-winning book, "The Continent of International Law: Explaining Agreement Design" (Cambridge University Press), focuses on how international law can be structured to make international cooperation most successful given harsh international political realities. Koremenos has published in both political science and law journals, including American Political Science Review, International Organization, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Journal of Legal Studies, and Law and Contemporary Problems. She is currently serving on a National Academy of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine committee concerning Mutual Recognition Agreements in Medicine.

If you are a person with a disability who requires an accommodation to attend this event, please reach out to weisercenter@umich.edu at least 2 weeks in advance of this event. Please be aware that advance notice is necessary as some accommodations may require more time for the university to arrange.