Abstract
School accountability systems are intended to lead schools to educate children more efficiently and raise student performance. However, accountability systems also provide incentives for educators to attempt to manipulate the system so that they look as good as possible. This presentation provides evidence on the desired and unintended consequences of school accountability. I focus on how the design of school accountability system can affect these various consequences, and offer some lessons that states can take to heart as they plan their No Child Left Behind Act waiver proposals this winter.

David Figlio is the Orrington Lunt Professor of Education and Social Policy and Economics and Fellow of the Institute for Policy Research at Northwestern University. He is also a Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research and a founding member of the CESifo Research Program on the Economics of Education. He was the inaugural co-editor of Education Finance and Policy and serves as an associate editor of seven other scholarly journals in economics and education. His research on education and social policy has been published in numerous leading journals including the American Economic Review, Journal of Public Economics, Journal of Law and Economics, and Journal of Human Resources. David has served on numerous national education task forces and panels, and has advised several U.S. states and foreign nations on the design, implementation and evaluation of education policies. Prior to joining the Northwestern faculty in 2008, David taught at the University of Florida, where he was the Knight-Ridder Professor of Economics and before that at the University of Oregon. He received his Ph.D. in Economics in 1995 from the University of Wisconsin-Madison.