"How Could States Use Nuclear Weapons? Four Models After the Bomb."

Abstract: According to the Theory of the Nuclear Revolution (TNR), nuclear weapons bring peace between the great powers because they are the ultimate tools of deterrence. The nuclear balance matters little once states have reliable second strikes. U.S. pursuit of nuclear superiority during the Cold War was therefore irrational. This theory is currently under attack. This paper reviews some recent critiques of TNR and proposes an alternative interpretation. It is very difficult to learn about the effectiveness of nuclear policy. Crises are rare and their outcomes are often overdetermined. U.S. pursuit of nuclear superiority could appear sensible, but it did not emerge from an optimal learning process. Superiority can enhance coercive leverage, but it does so by increasing the risk of disaster, with first-strike capabilities being especially destabilizing. This risk of disaster should be factored into any assessment of nuclear policy.