Suppose that a democratic society has an associative duty to assist a specific group of individuals, the Usual Suspects group. Members of this group frequently do not go to their jobs. They are seen mostly in streets, smoking, drinking and having fun. They are defaulting debtors. They often cheat on the welfare system, claiming to be unable to work. Since they run quickly out of money, they often shoplift in small quantities and evade taxes. They are more prolific than their fellow citizens. Their children, for some combination of a culture of poverty, low opportunities and bad parenting, usually miss classes, medical appointments and reproduce the eternal cycle of poverty and dependence.

A democratic society could assume this duty for several reasons: they are citizens, they are humans or for their children extreme vulnerability. However, this obligation can be fulfilled in multiple ways. Society can assist them conditionally or unconditionally; can offer them lucrative jobs or can force them to work in exchange of meager assistance; can give them cash or untradeable vouchers; can demand sterilization from mothers or can improve public services; can create special houses for their children. These choices depend heavily in the accuracy of Usual Suspects diagnose.

In this communication, I challenge this Usual Suspects narrative in social protection, which has been active since English Poor Laws to the expansion of Conditional Cash Transfers in Latin-America. First, I will claim that there are no empirical nor normative arguments for taking suspicion as a default attitude to poor. Second, I argue that there are relational reasons for reducing suspicion in social protection policies: it will not only improve the probability of the least advantaged of escaping poverty but it will also improve the most advantaged members capacities for moral reasoning.

(Link to paper for pre-read is available below.)