Skip to Content

Sponsors

No results

Tags

No results

Types

No results

Search Results

Events

No results
Search events using: keywords, sponsors, locations or event type
When / Where
All occurrences of this event have passed.
This listing is displayed for historical purposes.

Department of Economics pres.

Social, Behavioral & Experimental Economics (SBEE): Lying and Deception in Games

Joel Sobel, University of California San Diego

economics economics
economics
Abstract

This article proposes definitions of lying, deception, and damage in strategic settings. Lying depends on the existence of accepted meanings for messages, but does not require a model of how the audience responds to messages. Deception does require a model of how the audience interprets messages, but does not directly refer to consequences. Damage requires consideration of the consequences of messages. Lies need not be deceptive. Deception does not require lying. Lying and deception are compatible with equilibrium. I give conditions under which deception must be damaging.
economics economics
economics

Explore Similar Events

  •  Loading Similar Events...
Report Event As Inappropriate Contact Event Organizers
Back to Main Content