In this talk, we review the classical Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, which states that no ranked voting system can convert the preferences of individuals into a community-wide ranking under three normatively appealing criteria, and we discuss the theorem's implications for a democratic body in relation to social welfare. The three criteria for impossibility are notably stringent, so we then turn to classical relaxations of these criteria, which will be summarized via Harsanyi's Utilitarian Theorem. However, Harsanyi's result has the drawback of being limited to a static environment with a finite number of individuals. We present new results that allow for Harsanyi's result to be extended to a dynamic choice environment while also allowing for an infinite number of individuals. Moreover, as the community-wide ranking takes on the functional form of a weighted sum, we analyze the asymptotic properties of the uniquely derived weights. Speaker(s): Andrew McMillan (University of Michigan)