Skip to Content

Sponsors

No results

Tags

No results

Types

No results

Search Results

Events

No results
Search events using: keywords, sponsors, locations or event type
When / Where

Presented By: Department of Economics

On the optimal design of transfers and income-tax progressivity, with P. Grübener, G. Navarro and O. Vardishvili

Axelle Ferriere, Paris School of Economics

On the optimal design of transfers and income-tax progressivity, with P. Grübener, G. Navarro and O. Vardishvili On the optimal design of transfers and income-tax progressivity, with P. Grübener, G. Navarro and O. Vardishvili
On the optimal design of transfers and income-tax progressivity, with P. Grübener, G. Navarro and O. Vardishvili
We study the optimal design of means-tested transfers and progressive income taxes. In a simple analytical model, we demonstrate an optimally negative relation between transfers and income-tax progressivity due to efficiency and redistribution concerns. In a rich dynamic model, we quantify the optimal plan with flexible tax-and-transfer functions. Transfers should be larger than currently in the U.S. and financed with moderate income-tax progressivity. Transfers are key to implement higher progressivity in average than in marginal tax-and-transfer rates, achieving redistribution while preserving efficiency. Quantitatively, the left tail of the income distribution determines optimal transfers, whereas the right tail determines income-tax progressivity.
On the optimal design of transfers and income-tax progressivity, with P. Grübener, G. Navarro and O. Vardishvili On the optimal design of transfers and income-tax progressivity, with P. Grübener, G. Navarro and O. Vardishvili
On the optimal design of transfers and income-tax progressivity, with P. Grübener, G. Navarro and O. Vardishvili

Explore Similar Events

  •  Loading Similar Events...
Report Event As Inappropriate Contact Event Organizers
Back to Main Content