Presented By: Department of Economics
Labor Economics: nterdependent Values in Matching Markets: Evidence from Medical School Programs in Denmark (joint with Martin Hackmann, Adam Kapor, Sofia Moroni, Anne Brink Nandrup)
Benjamin Friedrich, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University
Abstract:
This paper studies imperfect information and interdependent values in matching markets, with an application to Danish medical school programs. We combine unique data on college applicants’ program preferences, programs’ admission decisions, and student outcomes to provide direct evidence on the value of screening and the winner’s curse in matching markets. To this end, we leverage the two-tiered Danish admission system with predetermined shares of GPA-based and program-specific screening-based admissions. We first use an RD design to document that applicant screening provides extra information over GPA on program completion. We then take advantage of an information experiment where one medical program intensified their screening efforts in a difference-in-difference design. While this program substantially increased completion rates after the reform, their experiment worsened the winner's curse in the rival program, providing direct evidence for common values. In the second part of the analysis, we develop and estimate a structural model that yields these empirical facts as equilibrium outcomes of a two-sided matching market. Our counterfactual analysis aims to analyze potential inefficiencies of the current DA mechanism by allowing for alternative information structures and assessing changes in players’ strategies and welfare outcomes.
* To join the seminar, please contact at econ.events@umich.edu
This paper studies imperfect information and interdependent values in matching markets, with an application to Danish medical school programs. We combine unique data on college applicants’ program preferences, programs’ admission decisions, and student outcomes to provide direct evidence on the value of screening and the winner’s curse in matching markets. To this end, we leverage the two-tiered Danish admission system with predetermined shares of GPA-based and program-specific screening-based admissions. We first use an RD design to document that applicant screening provides extra information over GPA on program completion. We then take advantage of an information experiment where one medical program intensified their screening efforts in a difference-in-difference design. While this program substantially increased completion rates after the reform, their experiment worsened the winner's curse in the rival program, providing direct evidence for common values. In the second part of the analysis, we develop and estimate a structural model that yields these empirical facts as equilibrium outcomes of a two-sided matching market. Our counterfactual analysis aims to analyze potential inefficiencies of the current DA mechanism by allowing for alternative information structures and assessing changes in players’ strategies and welfare outcomes.
* To join the seminar, please contact at econ.events@umich.edu
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